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Abstract
In a variety of domains, children have been observed to over-
regularize inconsistent input, while adults are more likely to
“probability match” to any inconsistency. Many explanations
for this have been offered, usually relating to cognitive differ-
ences between children and adults. Here we explore an ad-
ditional possibility: that differences in the social assumptions
participants bring to the experiment can drive differences in
over-regularization behavior. We explore this in the domain
of language, where assumptions about error and communica-
tive purpose might have a large effect. Indeed, we find that
participants who experience less pressure to be “correct” and
who have more reason to believe that any inconsistencies do
not correspond to an underlying regularity do over-regularize
more. Implications for language acquisition in children and
adults are discussed.
Keywords: over-regularization; statistical learning; probabil-
ity matching; language acquisition
Introduction
In a variety of situations, humans given probabilistic input
will tend to probability match – that is, they respond differ-
entially in a way that is proportional to those probabilities. In
learning theory, this occurs when people (or animals) choose
a stimulus proportional to the relative number of times it has
been reinforced (e.g., Herrnstein, 1961, 1970; Baum, 1979;
Pierce & Epling, 1983; Wearden, 1983). In decision making,
this occurs when people are asked to predict the next item in a
sequence (e.g., a card drawn from a deck, or a flashing light)
and respond by choosing proportionally to the frequency of
that item in the past (e.g., Castellan, 1974; Shanks, Tunney,
& McCarthy, 2002; Vulkan, 2000). And in language learning,
this occurs when people given linguistic input that varies in-
consistently (such as an affix or particle occurring only 60%
of the time, for no apparent reason) and they produce that par-
ticle proportional to its frequency in the input (e.g., Hudson
Kam & Newport, 2005, 2009).
Although these cases vary widely in many details, what
is interesting in all of them is that an overmatching or max-
imizing strategy may often be the more sensible one. This
strategy, also called over-regularization in the language liter-
ature, involves producing or responding to the most frequent
item closer to 100% of the time, rather than in a way that is
proportional to its probability or frequency. Such a strategy
is more sensible for different reasons in different domains.
One receives more reinforcement if one always chooses the
more frequently-reinforced stimulus; one makes more suc-
cessful predictions if one always chooses the most frequent
item; and one minimizes the burden on the listener as well as
the chance of miscommunication by removing linguistic vari-
ability when it serves no purpose. Given this, why do people
probability match?
One clue may come from the literature on children’s be-
havior. Although children are less well-studied than that of
adults, there is some evidence that preschool-aged children
may overmatch or over-regularize more in a decision making
or reinforcement learning context (Jones & Liverant, 1960;
Derks & Paclisanu, 1967). This is consistent with the small
amount of work on children in a linguistic domain suggesting
that they are more likely than adults to over-regularize there
as well (Hudson Kam & Newport, 2005, 2009). These find-
ings are somewhat limited, since they are based on relatively
few studies (especially in the area of language) and gener-
ally involve statistical rather than absolute differences: that
is, more children over-regularize than adults, but some still
do not. Nevertheless, they raise the intriguing possibility that
whatever factor causes adults to probability match may play
less of a role in preschool-aged children.
What might that factor be? A common hypothesis is that it
is related to a cognitive change occurring between childhood
and adulthood. One possibility is that preschool children
have poorer metacognitive control – that is, they find it dif-
ficult to inhibit a previous response (Jones & Liverant, 1960;
Weir, 1964), have a harder time monitoring and responding
to conflict in their representations (Ramscar & Gitcho, 2007),
and/or are more insensitive to the reward structure (Stevenson
& Hoving, 1964). Another is that childrens’ poorer memory
and/or processing abilities might result in over-regularization
(Hudson Kam & Newport, 2005, 2009).
Although there is support for many of these possibilities,
it is also possible that the difference arises, at least in part,
for a more prosaic reason: adults and children may be given
slightly different tasks, or have different interpretations of the
same task. It is natural for minor task differences to arise as
a natural by-product of the effort to make the same experi-
ment apply to widely varying age groups. There were indeed
small differences in all of the experiments in which differ-
ential over-regularization is observed (e.g. Jones & Liver-
ant, 1960; Derks & Paclisanu, 1967; Hudson Kam & New-
port, 2005, 2009). However, we are more interested here
in the kinds of differences in interpretation that might arise
even with precisely the same methodology. That is, different
groups (like children and adults) might have different inter-
pretations or different assumptions that they bring to the ex-
act same task. As explained below, this may be particularly
an issue in linguistic tasks, which are the focus of this work.
This paper explores one main question: is human behav-
ior in a language-learning domain affected by changes in
the goal or assumptions underlying the task? It is known
that adults can be pushed away from probability matching by
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varying the delay between changing a response and reinforce-
ment (Baum, 1975), punishing people for some responses
(Bradshaw, Szabadi, Bevan, & Ruddle, 1979), making one re-
sponse easier (Bradshaw, Ruddle, & Szabadi, 1981), making
rewards especially enticing (Shanks et al., 2002), or offering
extensive corrective feedback (Shanks et al., 2002). How-
ever, none of these possibilities are relevant when the task is
linguistic, since language learners generally receive little to
no direct feedback or reinforcement, both in the real world
(Pinker, 1989) and in this kind of task (e.g., Hudson Kam &
Newport, 2005, 2009; Perfors & Burns, 2010; Perfors, 2011).
What goals or assumptions might adults and older children
have that younger children do not, which cause the former
to probability match but the latter to over-regularize? We
hypothesize that adults and older children may feel a strong
sense that there is a “right” answer, and a concomitant pres-
sure to be pressure to be “correct” that younger children do
not. We noticed in previous studies run in our lab (Perfors
& Burns, 2010; Perfors, 2011) that adults reported a strong
intuition that there must be some underlying reason behind
the inconsistency in the linguistic input they received; for in-
stance, one participant confided that they thought all of the
“shiny things” were linguistically marked in the same way.
In reality, there were no regularities between the inconsistent
items and anything else in the experiment, but the participants
did not know that and often tried to produce language in ac-
cordance with the regularities they thought they had observed.
Why did our adult subjects have such a strong intuition
that there were regularities in the input? One possibility is
that this is simply an intuition that all people typically bring
to any language-learning scenario. It is not an unreasonable
assumption; although some phenomena in language are truly
arbitrary, much variation does occur for a reason. If people
truly do always come to language learning tasks with this as-
sumption, then we would expect adults to show the same be-
havior regardless of where they thought the language came
from or what their goal in the learning task was. Conversely,
this intuition may have been caused by, or at least exacer-
bated by, characteristics of the situation: being in an official
lab, presented with stimuli that are clearly designed and non-
accidental, and asked to learn about those stimuli all create
the strong impression that there actually is some regularity
there to learn. By contrast, real linguistic input contains many
errors and inconsistencies that arise from the fact that it is
produced on the fly, for communication, by real people. If
young children are either more blind to the social pressures
inherent in a lab-based experiment or more likely to interpret
underlying irregularities in the input as errors, then this might
be responsible for at least some of the observed difference
in over-regularization between children and adults. After all,
it is sensible to over-regularize inconsistencies if they do not
hide some underlying regularity that you will be judged for
missing.
A full test of our hypothesis would require us to manipu-
late children’s beliefs about the nature of the input they are
receiving and and experiment they are in. This is very diffi-
cult to do, and it is even more difficult to evaluate whether it
has been done successfully. Alternatively, we can test the as-
sumptions underlying our hypothesis by investigating adults.
If adults respond to task characteristics that remove a pres-
sure for generating “correct” responses by over-regularizing
more, then this offers some support for the idea that at least
part of the reason for the different behavior of children and
adults might relate to different assumptions about the task.
Therefore, in this paper we explore the hypothesis that
adult over-regularization behavior can be changed by chang-
ing the pressure for generating “correct” responses. This
pressure is manipulated in two ways. First, we vary the
cover story to change the assumptions people make about
how likely the data is to reflect an underlying regularity of
some sort. Second, we vary the goal of the task to empha-
size or de-emphasize effective communication. Consistent
with our hypothesis, we find that when the pressure for cor-
rect communication is reduced, adults over-regularize more.
In the discussion we consider the implications of these re-
sults for experimental work on over-regularization, probabil-
ity learning, and language learning more broadly.
Experiment
Participants. 52 adults1 were recruited from the University
of Adelaide and surrounding community and were paid $10
for their time. Participants were divided randomly into one
of two conditions, HIGH PRESSURE and NO PRESSURE (de-
scribed below). One person in the HIGH PRESSURE condi-
tion suffered a computer error causing a failure to save data,
and two participants in the NO PRESSURE condition were ex-
cluded from the analysis for typing gibberish.2 This left 25
participants in the HIGH PRESSURE condition and 24 in the
NO PRESSURE condition.
Procedure. The standard task, which was the same in both
conditions, involved a word learning task originally modelled
after Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) and Perfors (2011).
The original Hudson Kam and Newport (2009) taught a lan-
guage containing many words taught over multiple days, but
the key element for our purposes was that in this language,
units (which they called determiners) covaried with the nouns
in an inconsistent fashion: participants heard the main de-
terminer only 60% of the time. Participants were asked to
provide the noun and determiner associated with a scene and
sentence and the frequency with which each determiner was
produced after each noun was noted.
As in Perfors (2011), we removed extraneous elements of
the task so as to focus on the aspect involved in producing the
inconsistent units. Our language consists of words composed
from 10 stems, all one-syllable consonant-vowel-consonant
nonsense words mapped to images representing common ob-
1We ran 52 rather than the more round 50 because the HIGH
PRESSURE condition required pairs of participants (an even number
of people). We matched that number in the NO PRESSURE condition.
2This was reflected in their accuracy score, which was over four
standard deviations below the mean accuracy for either condition.
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jects. Each stem was attached to a by a one-syllable affix:
the main affix occurred 60% of the time, and each of the four
noise affixes occurred 10% of the time.3 The main difference
between this study and the previous ones is that while they
were entirely auditory in both their presentation of stimuli
and the modality of the response, in this study everything was
written. This was necessary in order to make the experimen-
tal manipulation possible and believable, as explained below.
Words were presented with no space between the stem and
the affix: thus, participants would see words like PIMUT or
JAFIG. They were not told that each of the words was com-
posed from smaller units. The specific image-label mapping
and choice ofmain affix was randomized for each participant.
As in Perfors (2011), the task consisted of a total of 200
trials of image-label pairs. On each trial, an image appeared
on the computer screen and at the same time the person saw a
label written in all capitals below it: for instance, they might
see a picture of a baby and read YOKOM. People went to the
next trial by clicking a next button. Learning was tested with
20 questions every 100 trials, for a total of 40 test questions.
At each test, the participant was presented with an image and
asked to enter the label for it. No feedback was given.
Conditions. The goal of this experiment was to explore
the possibility that adult over-regularization behavior can be
affected by changing the pressure for generating “correct” re-
sponses. We therefore constructed two conditions, one de-
signed to increase this pressure as much as possible, and one
designed to decrease it as much as possible.
HIGH PRESSURE. In this condition, we tried to increase
the pressure to be correct by pairing each participant with an-
other person who was in the lab at the same time. Each person
was informed that the goal of this experiment was to learn a
new language, and then successfully use it to communicate
with the other person. They were asked to imagine they were
scientists who had just discovered a community speaking this
language, and they had gotten an informant to label a series
of pictures for them. They were to read these labels, and then
they would be tested on how well they had learned them by
having to fill in the labels for new pictures. Participants sat
at different computers and did the standard task individually,
but at the end of the standard task each person was given the
labels the other person generated during their test questions,
and asked to match each of those labels with the correct im-
age. The participants were told that they would get paid pro-
portionally to how many of this final set of questions both of
them got right. This created a great deal of social pressure to
learn the language correctly, since not only was each individ-
uals’ payment dependent on it, so was their partner’s.
It is important to note that this manipulation in itself does
not favor either over-regularization or probability matching.
Since the affixes did not correlate to the images at all, people
could get 100% correct on the test regardless of what they
3Stems were: dut, sil, zeg, mab, yok, pim, ren, jaf, wux, and cov
and the affixes were: om, ep, ad, ig, and ut. Objects used were:




























Figure 1: Accuracy in mapping the stems to the correct item. Both
conditions showed high accuracy, and there is no significant dif-
ference between conditions. This suggests that any differences in
over-regularization probably do not occur because participants were
paying different amounts of attention to the stems and affixes.
did with the affixes, as long as the stems were matched to the
correct image. Thus, any effect on over-regularization is due
to increasing the sense that there is a “right answer” as well
as the social pressure to find that right answer – not because
participants could make more money using one strategy.
NO PRESSURE. In this condition, the pressure for being
“correct” was reduced in two ways: first, by not pairing par-
ticipants with a partner and making their payment dependent
on performance in any way; and second, by changing the
cover story so that people were less likely to believe there
was an absolutely correct answer. The cover story in this
condition was that we were studying how languages change
when multiple people learn it. Thus, a previous participant
had learned some words in a fake language, and during the
course of the learning they were presented with images and
asked to label them with those words. Current participants
were told that they were being given the labels that had been
generated by the previous participant, and that those labels
might be kind of strange if the previous person made errors
or did something weird. The participants were asked to just
do their best to learn the language, and to provide labels that
would then be given to the next participant.
A critical element of this design is that the standard task
was exactly the same across conditions. All of the data we
analyze here is from that standard task (since the partner test-
ing in the HIGH PRESSURE condition was only there to de-
termine payment, and not relevant to our research question).
The only difference between conditions that could affect the
data we analyze is what participants thought their goal was
and how they thought the stimuli were generated.
Results
The main question of interest is how much participants in
each condition over-regularized by producing the main af-































Figure 2: Proportion of time the most common affix is produced in
each condition (after having occurred 60% of the time in the input).
Participants in the NO PRESSURE condition over-regularized signifi-
cantly more than did participants in the HIGH PRESSURE condition.
it is first necessary to determine whether any differences in
over-regularization are associated with differences in overall
performance or attention between conditions.
Accuracy. We can calculate an accuracy score for each
condition, based on the percentage of stems that are gener-
ated in response to the appropriate item. A stem is counted
as correct if it is no more than one letter different from the
correct stem; thus, cav would be an acceptable variant of cov,
but div would not be.4 As Figure 1 demonstrates, people in
both conditions were highly accurate, and there was also no
significant difference between conditions (t(47) = 0.807, p =
0.424, two-tailed). This suggests that any differences in over-
regularization did not result from people in the two groups
paying different amounts of attention to learning the stems or
affixes.
Over-regularization. The main question is if people show
different levels of over-regularization in each of the two con-
ditions. To determine this, we calculated the percentage of
time that the most commonly-used affix was used by each
participant. (For almost all participants, the most commonly-
used affix was the main one; however, we did not want to pre-
sume that it always would be). As with the accuracy score,
two affixes counted as the same if they differed by no more
than one letter.5
Figure 2 shows the average percentage of trials in which
participants produced the most common affix. It is evident
that participants in the HIGH PRESSURE condition approxi-
mately probability match, while participants in the NO PRES-
4All analyses were also performed with a definition requiring the
stem to match exactly; results were qualitatively identical.
5We also performed all possible combinations of two additional
analyses. In the first, we used a more stringent definition of same-
ness, such that the affixes had to be identical to be counted. In the
second, we considered only the subset of affixes for which the stem
had been applied correctly. In all of these cases, participants in the
NO PRESSURE condition over-regularized significantly more than
participants in the HIGH PRESSURE condition.
Figure 3: Histogram of the number of participants according to how
often they produced the most common affix. It appears that in the
HIGH PRESSURE condition, there is a unimodel distribution of re-
sponses centered near 60%. By contrast, the NO PRESSURE condi-
tion appears to have a bimodal distribution of one group that over-
regularizes strongly and another group that probability matches.
SURE condition over-regularize significantly more (t(47) =
−2.250, p = 0.029, two-tailed). This sort of population-level
analysis can be misleading, however. It is possible that 60%
of the people in the HIGH PRESSURE condition produce the
most common affix 100% of the time and 40% of the people
never produce any affix more than once. Individual perfor-
mance can also be revealing about to what extent the condi-
tions resulted in different strategies among the participants.
Figure 3 therefore shows the histograms of each of the indi-
vidual participants. Although such histograms are inevitably
somewhat noisy and we should be careful about overinter-
preting, they suggest two things. First, the number of partic-
ipants who over-regularize in an extreme way (by producing
the most common affix 80% of the time or more) is notice-
ably higher in the NO PRESSURE condition. In other words,
these population differences actually do reflect the presence
of more people who over-regularize strongly. The second in-
teresting thing is that the distribution of participants in the
HIGH PRESSURE condition is approximately unimodal: most
people produce the most common affix between 40% and
70% of the time, and there are few outliers on either extreme.
By contrast, the distribution in the NO PRESSURE condition
looks more bimodal: there is one group of people who over-
regularize strongly, and another set who do not. We will ad-
dress some of the implications of this in the next section.
Discussion
Overall, this work indicates that adults over-regularize incon-
sistent linguistic input more often when placed in a situation
in which the pressure for correct responding is reduced and
they have reason to believe that the inconsistency does not
correspond to an underlying regularity. Indeed, what strategy
is sensible changes depending on whether one believes that
the affixes covary according to some hidden regularity, or co-
vary arbitrarily. If there is a regularity, it is sensible to try to
find and match it; if not, it is sensible to remove the inconsis-
tency. The NO PRESSURE condition, by emphasizing that the
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input came from a previous participant who might have made
errors, strongly implied that any variability was random or
accidental. In contrast, the HIGH PRESSURE condition, by
giving a cover story implying that the participant was a scien-
tist whose job it was to learn the language, and especially by
making payment contingent on successful “communication”
of that language, created the strong implication that there was
some regularity there to learn. It is interesting that increas-
ing communicative pressure did not result in more removal
of inconsistency in the language; again, this is probably be-
cause the participants thought that the inconsistency reflected
an important regularity, even if they weren’t sure what it was.
Our two conditions confound two effects: one is about
the different assumptions participants might make about how
likely the data is to contain errors, and the other is about how
much pressure they feel to match some “correct” standard.
We did not try to disentangle these things here because it
would be very difficult, since simply knowing that the data
might contain errors would decrease the pressure to correctly
learn that data. The main point of this research is that differ-
ences in the impressions one brings to a task – whatever they
may be – can change the degree of over-regularization.
Other than the experimental manipulations, the main im-
plementational difference between this work and previous
work is that both the input and the responses were written
rather than auditory. However, since both conditions were
written, the non-auditory nature of the experiment could not
explain the difference between the conditions.
What does it mean that only some of the participants
adopted an over-regularization strategy in the NO PRESSURE
condition? One possibility is that those who did not adopt
one still assumed that the inconsistencies may have been as-
sociated (perhaps more noisily) with regularities in the data.
After all, it is a rather strange pattern of errors to have 10%
each of four other kinds of affixes, but no other misspellings
or incorrectly used stems. One way to investigate this possi-
bility would be to design an experiment in which the affixes
occur less often or there are additional errors in the input.
However, since it is known that adults over-regularize more
frequently when the inconsistency is less frequent (Hudson
Kam & Newport, 2009) and any introduction of other errors
would have to also occur in the HIGH PRESSURE condition in
order to make the tasks equal, it is not clear that such a manip-
ulation would be very illuminating. Still, this is a possibility
we will consider for future work.
A potential limitation of this work is that the differences
between the HIGH PRESSURE and NO PRESSURE conditions,
although statistically significant no matter how the data is an-
alyzed, are not large. In particular, even in the NO PRESSURE
condition, not as many adult participants over-regularized as
did children in Hudson Kam and Newport (2005) and Hudson
Kam and Newport (2009). For this reason one of the first
steps in future work will be to replicate these findings. That
said, our results might underestimate the magnitude of the
true effect to the extent that our participants didn’t believe the
“error” cover story but more of the children thought or as-
sumed that the language they heard had some errors. Another
quite likely possibility is that not all of the difference between
children and adults is reducible to their different assump-
tions. Finally, any effect of naturally different assumptions
between children and adults on the same task in Hudson Kam
and Newport (2005) and Hudson Kam and Newport (2009)
may have been exacerbated by subtle differences in their ex-
perimental design. In particular, while both adults and chil-
dren learned a language called “Sillyspeak”, only the children
were told they were learning from someone who did not know
the language themselves. It seems plausible that the children
were far more likely to conclude that their input contained a
lot more error, especially when combined with the very differ-
ent social assumptions about the nature of laboratory studies
that each group may have had.
What do these results mean for research showing that chil-
dren over-regularize in non-linguistic situations as well as lin-
guistic ones, as in Derks and Paclisanu (1967) and Jones and
Liverant (1960)? Any application to non-linguistic domains
must be made extremely cautiously, since many of the dif-
ferences between the HIGH PRESSURE and NO PRESSURE
conditions do not translate to a non-linguistic context. For
instance, there is no obvious analogue of errors in a deck of
cards or reinforcement pattern. In addition, these experiments
do not have the learner/teacher dynamic that the linguistic
ones do, which might be associated with very different pat-
terns of assumptions. That said, children may still feel less
pressure than adults to be “correct” or not look “stupid” to
the scientists, so we cannot rule out the possibility that this
plays a role even in non-linguistic domains.
Within the area of language, much of the interest in chil-
dren’s over-regularization arises because children and adults
differ in their propensity to over-regularize outside of the lab
as well as in it. Deaf children exposed to the inconsistent sign
language of hearing parents will over-regularize that language
and produce regular grammatical forms (Singleton & New-
port, 2004), but adult language learners are known to produce
highly variable, inconsistent utterances, even after years of
experience with the language and after their grammars have
stabilized (Johnson, Shenkman, Newport, & Medin, 1996). If
over-regularization in children in these experiments is driven
by differences in the assumptions they bring to the task, how
do we explain these differences in real life?
In answer, we can only speculate. However, several pos-
sibilities present themselves. One is that children’s over-
regularization in real life is driven by some of the same factors
that we are calling task demands here: that is, perhaps chil-
dren just assume that more of their input is irregular or full
of errors, or they are less bothered by trying to be “correct”
or not look like an idiot and therefore focus on simply com-
municating clearly. Another possibility is that the different
assumptions manipulated in the tasks here do not explain all
of the differences between children and adults that are found
in laboratory experiments. Still another possibility is that the
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kind of over-regularization measured in these experimental
tasks does not map cleanly onto the over-regularization dif-
ferences observed in natural language. At a minimum, one of
these processes occurs in hours or days, and one takes years.
Moreover, children may not bring the same assumptions to
real language learning as to this kind of experimental task.
Even beyond that, most variation in natural language is con-
sistent in some way (e.g., Chambers, Trudgill, & Schilling-
Estes, 2003). Thus, any child/adult differences in learning
languages from native speakers6 may not be traceable to the
kinds of over-regularization differences found in these exper-
iments. Thus, the implications for language acquisition must
be speculative at this point, and we cannot say at this point for
sure how to reconcile these findings with the language acqui-
sition literature. It is important to note, however, that there
are many ways they could be reconciled. Pursuing this is a
project for future work.
This work may additionally have implications for adult
second language acquisition, since it demonstrates that adults
may change strategies in response to the nature of the explicit
instructions they receive. This too is a project for future work.
The bottom line from this paper is that it is important to
be cautious about drawing strong conclusions from existing
laboratory studies to differences in how children and adults
over-regularize when learning natural language. At the very
least, the story is probably complex. For instance, some work
shows that infants probability match in a looking time exper-
iment (Davis, Newport, & Aslin, 2011), and even some of
the original work in non-linguistic domains showed that chil-
dren over-regularized the same amount as adults (Weir, 1964)
or flipped strategies differentially depending on the nature of
the reward (Stevenson & Hoving, 1964). The picture is there-
fore currently somewhat murky, even as regards the extent to
which – and at what ages – children tend to over-regularize
more than people of other ages.
In sum, this paper offers some reason to believe that over-
regularization behavior can be driven by different assump-
tions about the goal of the experimental task and the origin
of the data. If we are to understand what drives differences
between adult and child language learning, we need to deter-
mine the extent to which the experimental findings in the lit-
erature stem from differences in such assumptions. It is also
critical to further explore the extent to which these assump-
tion explain differences in the learning of natural languages.
This work is the first step along that path.
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